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One of the fundamental aims of revolutionary socialist
development in the marxist tradition has been that of
transforming economic processes, replacing the
'anarchy' of markets under capitalism with the
'scientific' determination of social needs through
planning [Bettelheim 1976]. Early theorists of Soviet
socialism, such as Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, held
that, as the new socialist society arose, it would
displace the 'economic categories' characteristic of
capitalism (value, price, wages, profits). The science of
economics itself would become obsolete, to be
replaced by a merely technical discipline of rational
economic calculation in a society organised as a single
'people's workshop' [Bukharin 1920 (1971): 12;
Bukharin and Preobrazhensky 1920(1969); Brus
1973:ch 6]. Marxist economists have argued that,
while markets are not peculiar to the capitalist system,
they have reached their peak of historical development
therein, on the one hand operating as the underlying
logic of economic processes and, on the other hand,
(along with class conflict) as a fundamental source of
capitalism's chronic instability and eventual collapse.
Over the past half century, while capitalism has sought
to control the destructive potential of markets,
socialism has grappled with the problem of
constructing a productive alternative to them. In each
case, the role of the state has been crucial.
Revolutionary socialists in power have faced the
challenge of translating mobilisational metaphors and
academic constructs such as 'scientific planning' and
'cooperative production' into social mechanisms
capable of surpassing the economic achievements of
capitalism. While the founding fathers of Marxism
were optimistic - overly so - about the capacity of
socialist planners and organised populations to
assume conscious and democratic control of
economies already highly developed by capitalism, the
actual conditions of revolutionary socialist success
- in relatively undeveloped societies - have greatly
restricted the choice of institutional embodiments of
the 'plan'.
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In the Soviet case, and in more recent Third World
contexts, the logic of socialist aims (class trans-
formation and planned economy) and of under-
development (low levels of savings and technology,
pervasive scarcity, lack of trained personnel, economic
dependence and international hostility) have combined
to create an equation between the 'social mechanism
of planning' and a pervasive, hierarchical state
apparatus [Senghaas 1981]. It is the state which has
taken on a dual historical role: as a developmental elite
counterpart to the capitalist entrepreneurial class and
as a system of economic coordination counterpart to
markets. Though lamented by liberals and leftists
alike, there is an inexorability about this equation in
the early stages of socialist transformation. As we shall
see later, however, the logic of statism grows weaker as
its initial tasks are fulfilled, and the contradictions
between a pervasive state and the requirements of
social, economic and political development intensify.
Socialist Transformation of Chinese Industry
China provides a particularly dramatic example of
both the capacities and limits of the socialist state as an
instrument of industrialisation. Like their nationalist
and imperial predecessors, the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who assumed power
in Beijing in 1949 saw rapid and comprehensive
industrialisation as the basic way to strengthen China
as a nation-state - there was no question of whether
or when to industrialise, but how. They inherited a
sizeable state industrial sector from the Kuomintang
regime, producing 34.7 per cent of total industrial
output value in 1949 [Xue 1981:18]. The impetus
towards industrialisation, particularly heavy industry,
was further strengthened by the hostile international
environment of the early l950s and the influence of
Soviet economic advice and assistance.
Given the specific conditions of the Chinese
revolution, the new regime's attitude to indigenous
industrial capitalists was far more favourable than
their bolshevik precursors in the aftermath of the
October Revolution. The national bourgeoisie' was
defined as an ally against imperialism and was initially
recognised as one of the four collaborating classes
which formed the official social basis of the post-
revolutionary state. But indigenous Chinese industrial
capital was weakly developed in 1949 (particularly in
heavy industry) and was weakened further by an
outflow of capitalists and managers, particularly to
Hong Kong and Taiwan, in the immediate pre- and
post-revolutionary period. Over the longer term,
moreover, the CCP realised that capitalists as a class,
and markets as social processes, were sources of
potentially countervailing power. Transformation of
the industrial mode of production was essential for
political as well as economic reasons.
Though the transition to state control of industry was
seen as essential, the mechanisms of transition were
relatively moderate and incremental, using economic
as well as politico-administrative methods. Indigenous
private industrial enterprises were not appropriated at
one fell swoop; there were two intermediate stages of
state capitalism'. In the first, dominant up to 1953, the
state regulated private enterprises by economic means
- monetary measures, price controls, taxation - and
by gradually expanding control over supplies of raw
materials and wholesale trade in industrial com-
modities. In the second phase, the state gradually
converted private enterprises into joint state-private
concerns, sending party or government cadres to join
or supplant the original managers.
Table J
Transformation of private industry, l949S6
Percentages oÍ gross industrial output salue. encluding handicrafts.
Source: State Statistical Bureau 1960:38
By 1956, all modern sectors of capitalist industry had
been converted into joint enterprises. Though many
managers retained their posts after that date and
former owners continued to receive fixed interest
payments on their capital (until the height of the
Cultural Revolution in 1967), from 1956 onwards
these were de facto state enterprises. Along with this
transformation of private industry, the socialist state
sector expanded through renovation and expansion of
previous (Kuomintang or foreign) enterprises and an
ambitious programme of industrial construction
during the First Five Year Plan (1953-57). By 1956. all
China's modern industry was, de jure or de facto, in
state hands, as Table I shows.
Simultaneously, commerce was also socialised: in
wholesale trade, state and (state-controlled) Joint or
cooperative commerce handled 97.2 per cent of total
turnover by 1956; in retail trade, the figure was 95.8
per cent [Cheng 1982:ch 5].
Changes in formal ownership aside, the modern
industrial sector was gradually incorporated into the
new system of planned production and distribution
constructed during the First Five Year Plan along the
lines of the traditional centralised Soviet model. In this
system, central planning agencies calculate overall
economic balances, in static and dynamic terms, and
government agencies at different levels specify and
transmit orders on output and distribution to
subordinate productive units. In China, state agencies
specified eight quantitative and qualitative targets
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1949 34.7 2.0 7.5 55.8
1950 45.3 2.9 14.9 36.9
1951 45.9 4.0 21.4 28.7
1952 56.0 5.0 21.9 17. 1
1953 57.5 5.7 22.8 14.0
1954 62.8 12.3 19.6 5.3
1955 67.7 16.1 13.2 3.0
1956 67.5 32.5
state stale-capitalist private
rear indusíri' industry industry
joint private
st ate- enterprises
private producing
enterprises for the state
which were binding on enterprise managers: total
output value, product mix, quality, consumption of
raw materials and energy, total wage bill, costs of
production, profits (ie net revenue) and working
capital. In such a system, market mechanisms play a
marginal role: investment ratios are administratively
determined and there are no capital markets; prices
are administratively determined and regulated; money
plays a passive, accounting role; the pattern of output
is overwhelmingly determined by the preferences of
state officials (not merely 'planners'), not market
demand: and sectoral relationships are determined by
a 'material balancing' process based on technical
coefficients without any systematic opportunity-cost
accounting based on real or shadow markets. In terms
of official categories, relations among industrial
enterprises and between state organs and enterprises
were not (following Stalin) to be based on exchange of
commodities based on the 'law of value', but were
subject to unified accounting at the national level, as if
industry were one large corporation.
There were important, but relatively residual, market
elements: notably in relations between (state) industry
and cooperative agriculture and in retail sales of
industrial consumer goods. In the area of industrial
labour allocation, however, where the Soviet Union
and Eastern European states have made considerable
use of (regulated) markets, the Chinese system has
remained firmly under state regulation since the mid-
1950s [White 1982:620-l].
Though these central managerial features of Chinese
industrial economy remained consistent until the late
l970s, one must be careful not to confuse Chinese
practice with any simple model of 'central planning'.
During the maoist period industrial planning was a
contradictory amalgam of procedures, formal and
informal, built up coral-like over three decades.
Though retaining the classic Soviet form, it was
modified by successive waves of reform, notably
during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolution. The main thrust of these reforms was
towards organisational decentralisation of planning
and managerial powers from central to local
government (akin to Khrushchev's regional decen-
tralisation of the Soviet planning system after 1957),
resulting in a partial dispersion of regulative power.
Moreover, though a lot of activity described as
'planning' clearly went on, it was poorly informed,
weakly coordinated, circumscribed in scope and
uneven in impact. The resulting system was not very
'centralised' nor particularly 'planned'. But it was
heavily administered, a concept to be carefully
distinguished from planned. 'Plan' instructions were
issued as direct mandatory administrative require-
ments, rather than as indirect instructions designed to
set parameters within which enterprise managers
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could make their own economic decisions. The
resulting degree of bureaucratisation was tempered to
some extent in practice. The system was less 'top
down' than its Soviet predecessor; there was scope for
subordinate units to press their demands and
considerable bargaining between state organs and
their subordinate enterprises. Moreover, there was a
trend towards the emergence of informal markets in
raw materials, intermediate and finished products, as
enterprises sought to remedy shortages and unplug
bottlenecks by setting up barter networks manned by
'fixers'.
The maoist system of industrial planning was thus a
complex mixture of administrative regulation, political
bargaining (vertically and horizontally) and 'grey'
markets. But it was also a system in which the defining
characteristics of market processes were absent, weak
or driven underground: productive units lacked
autonomy, economic linkages were predominantly
vertical (state-enterprise), not horizontal (between
enterprises) [Liao 1980], production dominated
exchange (ie market demand had little impact on the
pattern of output) and the regulating role of prices was
very circumscribed.
Chinese Industrial Performance:
Achievements and Problems
The results achieved with this cumbersome framework
should not be underestimated. China was successful,
in a little over two decades, in establishing a relatively
comprehensive industrial structure while avoiding
dependence on foreign countries (except perhaps in
the mid-1950s). During the 1950s the ratio of
investment nose by an estimated 3.2-3.6 times
compared to. 1931-36 [Yeh 1968:510-11] and con-
sistently high (though fluctuating) rates of overall
accumulation1 have been maintained since then (for
figures, see State Statistical Bureau 1983:25 -
hereafter SSB). Most of these investment funds were
channelled into directly productive investment [SSB
1983:27], the lion's share going to industry, especially
heavy industry [SSB 1983:326-34]. The industrial
proportion of total national product rose substantially
and a formidable heavy industrial capacity was
established [SSB 1983:15, 216-17]. For example, the
value of machine-building output rose from 11.4 per
cent of total industrial output value in 1952 to 27.7 per
cent in 1975. The annual rate of growth in industrial
output value (in constant prices) was 10.9 per cent
flic accumulation lund is officiall\ defined as that part of the
national income a hich is used for expanded reproduction, non-
productive construction and increase of product ve and non-
productive stock its ni at erial format ion is the neu, lt added fi sed
asseiv ol material and non-material sectors (less depreciation of tite
total fixed assets) and the neu ly acquired circulating fund in kind by
the material sectors during the sear [State Statistical Bureau
1983:5 79-80 j.
between 1952-80, with the advance of hèavy industry
(13 per cent) outpacing that of light (9.5 per cent)
[Ishikawa 1983:2456].2 State industry dominated the
collective sector - the respective proportions were
77.8 per cent and 21.4 per cent of gross industrial
output value in 1982 [SSB 1983:222]. However,
though the industrial proportion of net output value in
industry and agriculture rose from 25.3 per cent in
1952 to 54.1 per cent in 1979, China had hardly been
transformed into an industrial society. As of 1979,
84.9 per cent of the total industrial and agricultural
workforce still worked in agriculture [Yang and Li
1980:103-4].
Impressive though these achievements appear, they
conceal certain basic problems which became
increasingly acute during the 1960s and 1970s.
Respectable (though fluctuating) statistical growth
figures were purchased at the cost of heavy constraints
on popular consumption. Levels of per capita earnings
and consumption of non-agricultural workers rose
sluggishly up to the mid-1970s, remaining static or
declining in certain periods (for varying estimates see
Ishikawa 1983:252-3 and Field 1983:652). While levels
of capital intensity in state industry were steadily
rising [White 1982:617], labour productivity and
efficiency of capital utilisation were falling. Marginal
capital-output ratios decreased significantly [Ishikawa
1983:253-60] and the net value of output per industrial
worker declined from 2763 to 2593 (current) yuan
between 1965 and 1975 [Nolan and White 1984:Table
8; compare Field 1983].
While there were a number of basic factors
contributing to this increasingly problematic per-
formance - such as political instability, international
isolation, and the intractability of the problem of
raising agricultural productivity - perhaps the main
factor identified by Chinese economists in the post-
Mao era was the negative impact of the state, both on
the structure and the functioning of the industrial
economy. First, there was a 'state bias' in development
strategy which privileged accumulation over con-
sumption, 'productive' over 'unproductive' investment
and heavy over light industry and agriculture (for
'state bias' in Chinese rural-urban policy, see Nolan
and White 1984; for a Chinese critique of investment
strategy, see Dong 1982). If accumulation and
industrialisation constituted the original raison d'être
of state control over industry, they were increasingly
converted into raison d'état, the means whereby the
state apparatus (and state workforce) expanded and
legitimised their dominance in society (this 'over-
accumulation' or 'accumulation bias' is a familiar
feature of state socialist economies; see Nuti
1979: 246-52).
For the oÍhcia! Chinese definitions at heas s' and 'light' ndustrv.
see SSB 1983;585-6.
Second, not only did state-owned industry formally
hold the dominant position in industry (and
commerce), but state organs gradually encroached on
the non-state sector, converting formally independent
collective enterprises into de facto state enterprises
(the same process of state encroachment also affected
agriculture, as Gray's contribution to this Bulletin
shows). Behind this lay a conception of socialist
development which equated étatisation with a higher
level of 'socialism'. Similarly the replacement of
remaining market elements with directive 'planned'
regulation was equated with 'socialist transition'.
Third, the system of centralised directive planning was
defined as an increasing impediment to more efficient
utilisation of resources and greater economic and
technical dynamism. Though these factors are closely
interrelated, for reasons of space we shall concentrate
on the third in the remainder of this article.
Chinese Industrial Planning: the market
reform critique
Chinese market reformers in the post-Mao era
concentrated their fire on the economic irrationalities
of the previous pattern of state involvement in
industry (for a more detailed discussion, see White
l983b). They have identified two crucial sets of
problematic relationships between state and economy:
first, between administrative systems and economic
processes and, second, between state organs of
economic management and basic-level productive
units.
According to the first set of critical arguments, direct
state involvement in industry creates a tension
between the different (but not necessarily contra-
dictory) social logics of the state and of 'natural'
economic processes. Pervasive state intervention can
impede economic development because it imposes an
inflexible network of administrative subdivisions
which break up the 'natural relations of the objective
economy'. Economic development involves an
increasing density of economic relationships,
('socialisation of production' in marxist terms) with an
increasingly complex pattern of differentiation and
coordination between economic units. To the extent
that adminstrative units cut across these proliferating
'organic connections' of specialisation and exchange,
they may distort and obstruct economic progress [Xue
and Ma 1982; Ma Hong 1981].
This administrative segmentation of the economy has
two basic forms, regional and departmental. Each
politico-administrative level - be this provtnce or
township - restructures the economy in its own image
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adopting 'protectionist' measures against competing
regions and striving to strengthen local autarky. The
policy issues thus raised are miniaturised versions of
debates about self-reliance and integration which are
usually posed at the national level. Turning to vertical
or departmental segmentation, industrial admini-
stration exercised by central departments on the
'branch principle' creates bureaucratic 'systems' (the
Chinese word is xitong), each of which has a tendency
to become an 'independent kingdom', thereby
impeding intersectoral coordination and technical
change.
This departmental and regional segmentation has led
Chinese economists to propose two broad avenues of
reform. First, they argue that administration and
economy, politics and economics should be separated
more clearly and the latter allowed to operate
according to their own 'organic' logic. On the one side,
this implies less state involvement and a change in the
nature of regulative procedures from direct to indirect,
'administrative' to 'economic'. On the other side, it
involves a revitalisation of markets and greater
awareness on the part of economic policy-makers of
the commoditised character of a socialist economy.
Second, to the extent that directive state regulation
remains appropriate in selected areas, ils efficiency
should be improved by strengthening the ability of
planning departments to curb 'departmentalism' and
establish a more rational division of labour between
central and local governments.
Turning to the second main set of critical arguments,
Chinese reformers have held that directive planning,
whether by central or local state organs, has robbed
industrial enterprises of all initiative, turning them
into beads on an abacus pushed hither and thither by
bureaucraticfingers[Ma 1981:19]. Undertheprevious
system of industrial planning, the level and type of
output and key elements of the production process
were determined by mandatory administrative fiat.
Investment funds were disbursed as (interest-free)
budgetary allocations; technical innovations and new
products needed approval from above; sources of
materials supply and sales outlets were arranged by
state organs, which also fixed prices; nearly all profits
were remitted to state financial organs and most of the
enterprise depreciation funds reverted to the state.
On the production side, the target of total output value
tended to outrank other (efficiency oriented) targets
- Chinese economists call it the 'father of the
emperor' [He 1979]. As a result, enterprises were
impelled to seek increased output value without
sufficient regard for cost or quality. On the materials
supply side, industrial enterprises suffered from
defects in the state-organised system of 'unified
allocation', which caused shortages and delays in
production [Ji and Rong 1979; Koziara and Yan 1983].
On the sales side, although output was theoretically
linked to demand through planning calculations,
responsibility for selling rested not with the enterprise
itself but with state commercial organs which had to
'sell what they produced'. The hiring of labour was
subject to strict administrative controls, so that
enterprises with idle material and equipment found it
difficult to reallocate or take on extra labour.
Enterprise managers' lack of financial power in the
context of 'unified receipts and unified expenditures'
meant that efficient enterprises often failed to gain
rewards for good performance and inefficient
enterprises received state subsidies for losses - this
form of redistribution was known as 'eating from the
same pot'. Since the discretionary funds of enterprise
managers were so limited, moreover, they were unable
to desïgn incentive schemes to improve labour
productivity.
The central theme running through these criticisms
was the severe economic cost of a system of industrial
management which either reduced enterprises to
passivity or, where it did stir their initiative, drove
them in unproductive directions. The 'key link' in
reforming this system, argued Chinese economists,
was the need for greater decision-making power for
enterprise managers vis-à-vis their bureaucratic
superiors [Jiang 1980], in a context of increasing inter-
enterprise linkages and market signals.
Industrial Reforms in Action: progress and
prospects
The overall strategy economic reforms which emerged
during 1978-79 contained four major sets of measures.
First, the national planning system was to be
streamlined, taking on a narrower range of macro-
economic functions, notably determination of the size
and growth-rate of national income, the ratio between
investment and consumption and the allocation of
strategic investments. The state was to continue to
play the crucial role of maintaining overall balances in
physical and financial, domestic and international
terms, and overseeing major changes in the industrial
structure. Second, planners were to make greater use
of 'economic levers' (such as credit, taxation, subsidy,
etc) to achieve their objectives in place of mandatory
targets. Third, 'natural' economic linkages were to be
allowed greater scope in defining relations between
enterprises and in setting the context for governmental
regulations (through the emergence of 'economic
regions' which cut across administrative boundaries).
Fourth, enterprises managers were to be granted
greater decision-making autonomy and their per-
formance 'verified' by increasing involvement in
competitive markets.
Though considerable progress has been made over the
past five years, it has been very uneven, both over time
and across sectors and policy areas (for a more
detailed analysis, see White 1983b1. The statistical
basis for accurate industrial planning has been
improved and greater attention has been paid to
refining macro and micro planning techniques,
drawing on Eastern European, Japanese and Western
experience. There was substantial progress towards
clarifying the spheres of market and plan. The CCP's
12th party congress in September 1982 stipulated that
in future, industry should be regulated in three basic
ways: 'directive' (zhilingxing) plans (with mandatory
targets) for key sectors and products (mainly strategic
producer goods, basic materials, and certain key
consumer goods), 'guidance' (zhidaoxing) plans with
reference targets, for non-strategic or relatively
plentiful producer goods and a considerable pro-
portion of consumer goods, and 'market' (shichang)
allocation for non-staple foodstuffs and smaller
consumer items [White 1983a:9-ll]. Each of these
processes involved progressively greater amounts of
enterprise autonomy and market links, the second
category, 'guidance planning', being a hybrid with
both plan and market elements.
Given the continued complexity of the tasks it
continues to tackle, however, the industrial planning
system is still basically unreformed. The scope of
'directive' plans has not contracted as much as
reformers would have liked - the 'eight targets' still
remain dominant. Though the importance of
'guidance' planning is strongly asserted, there is still a
considerable lack of clarity about what this means in
both theory and practice. Thus the fundamental
relationship between state and enterprises has
changed little. Though there has been some progress in
financial reforms (towards imposing capital charges
on investment funds, expanding the discretionary
funds of enterprise managers and substituting
taxation for the old system of profit remission), in
other areas change has been relatively marginal
(production planning and marketing, materials
procurement and labour recruitment).
Nor has the range of market processes expanded as
much as some of the original blueprints of 1978-79
envisaged. Though the scope of markets varies across
sectors, in general they have not generated the salutary
efficiency pressures and productive competition which
reform analyses promised. In particular, the authorities
have still to tackle the thorny problem of price reform;
without this, any serious expansion of the sphere of
'market regulation' is unthinkable. Without market
pressures working through price signals, the expansion
of decision-making autonomy for industrial managers
is hardly likely to bear fruit in terms of increasing
enterprise efficiency.
The prospects for moving towards a more productive
relationship between state and economy and greater
complementarity between plan and market are very
uncertain. While the past five years has brought
greater clarity about the analytical and practical
problems of combining plans and markets, the
constraints on reform have also become clearer.
Efforts to implement reform policies ran into serious
economic problems, notably budgetary deficits,
inflation, hyper-investment, price instability. There
was also formidable political opposition from former
supporters of radical maoism and from entrenched
interests within the state apparatus.
Indeed, the last five years have highlighted one of the
basic dilemmas of a socialist developmental state. The
record of the 1960s and 1970s suggests the growing
incapacity of the state institutions to direct the
economy in socially productive ways through the
traditional mechanisms of political mobilisation and
bureaucratic control. To respond to escalating
economic problems by strengthening traditional
methods could only make matters worse. On the other
hand, to embrace the reform programme fully would
bring about such a radical shift in relations between
state and society as to undermine the very basis of
leninist socialism. The state as problem-solver thus
confronts the state as an organised interest; the path to
reform will probably be tortuous and long.
Conclusion
What, if any, lessons can be drawn from the experience
of the Chinese state's role in the industrialisation
process? First, it may help to resist any simple,
ahistorical generalisations about the economic impact
of state intervention and support a case that different
forms and degrees of state involvement are appropriate
at different stages of the industrialisation process, with
traditional directive methods having greater relevance
and effectiveness in initial periods of basic construction
of structural change. Chinese experience also argues
that at all stages, not merely in more 'mature' phases
of industrialisation, state involvement needs to be
more selective in its scope (whether in terms of types of
economic decisions or of different economic sectors)
and more flexible in the forms of involvement adopted
(notably between 'directive' and 'guidance' methods).
The Chinese case also points to the importance of
striking a balance between state agencies and
productive units (whether state collective or private
enterprises) and developing a lively microeconomy
which can be channelled and not stifled by state
action. Finally, the Chinese experience illustrates the
general point that questions of economic management
and reform in state socialist contexts are deeply
political and not susceptible to merely technical
solutions they are problems of political economy in
the full sense of the term.
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